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SYLVIE DOUGLIS, BYLINE: NPR.
(SOUNDBITE OF DROP ELECTRIC’S “WAKING UP TO THE FIRE”)
WAILIN WONG, HOST:
This is THE INDICATOR FROM PLANET MONEY. I’m Wailin Wong.
ADRIAN MA, HOST:
And I’m Adrian Ma. There is a big question haunting the U.S. economy right now, and that is, can the Federal Reserve bring down high inflation without causing more economic pain in the form of lost jobs, without tipping the economy into a recession?
WONG: Today the Bureau of Labor Statistics released July CPI numbers that showed prices rose 8.5% from a year earlier. This is a slowdown from June, but inflation is still high. And the Fed will want to see more cooling off before it makes any big changes in its strategy.
MA: And this task facing the Fed is more than a binary of, can the economy avoid a recession or not? Really, it’s a question of, if the economy goes into recession, what will it look like? And because there are different kinds of recessions, some are more painful than others.
WONG: And the kind of recession that policymakers really want to avoid – the kind with the most painful recovery process – is called the L-shaped recession. Still, there’s been some debate about whether we need one to deal with this current bout of inflation in the U.S.
MA: Today on the show, we’re going to explore that question by looking at a cautionary tale of an L-shaped recession that happened in another country – Japan.
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WONG: To understand why an L-shaped recession is so undesirable, we have to look at the different types of recessions. Economists use letter names as a kind of shorthand to describe the shape that results from a graph of a country’s gross domestic product over time. By looking at these basic shapes, you can see both the decline and the upturn. And it’s the path of the upturn, the recovery, that is key in determining the letter shape. Takeo Hoshi is a professor of economics at the University of Tokyo.
TAKEO HOSHI: If the recession doesn’t continue, we know it’s a V-shaped recovery. If it continues longer, we start talking about U-shaped recovery. And if the economy doesn’t recover even then, in several years, we start talking about L-shaped recovery.
MA: Now, economic graphs are rarely neat and tidy, and so they don’t perfectly resemble these letters. You kind of have to, like, squint your eyes a bit and maybe tilt your head a few degrees. But these letter shapes can be a useful way to think broadly about how economies come back from different kinds of downturns. So the V-shaped recovery looks like a very steep decline and then a quick bounce back up to where the economy returns to where it started. Now picture a graph where instead of touching the bottom and bouncing back up, the growth level hangs out at the bottom before making a gradual ascent. This is a U-shaped recovery.
WONG: There’s also a K shape, where certain parts of the economy recover quickly while others keep suffering.
MA: This is turning into, like, the most depressing episode of Sesame Street ever.
WONG: (Laughter) I know. Oh.
MA: But there’s more. Now let us picture a graph where the economy hits the bottom, and then it just crawls along without going higher. That is the L-shaped recession, or L-shaped recovery – whatever you want to call it.
WONG: And it’s really not much of a recovery at all. This is the problem that plagued Japan during the ’90s and why that period is known as the country’s lost decade.
MA: It began in the late ’80s with a real estate bubble.
WONG: That sounds familiar.
MA: Yeah – sort of like what we would see in the U.S. a couple of decades later. In Japan – here is one factoid from the time – real estate prices were so inflated, the value of the land under the Imperial Palace in Tokyo was worth more than all of the land in California – like, the whole state.
HOSHI: There were lots of anecdotes that suggest the land prices in Japan may be too high.
MA: And of course, the bubble eventually burst. And what followed in the 1990s was a sort of economic malaise marked with slow growth and also falling prices.
WONG: In other words, deflation – something that’s maybe hard for us to get our minds around right now, given that we’re dealing with the totally opposite problem. Takeo says that, overall, deflation was not a disaster. The Japanese economy was mature. People had savings, and living standards remained high. But the flat or falling prices were part of a bigger, gloomier picture. They signaled an economy that had stopped growing.
HOSHI: So deflation, in a sense, is a result of economic stagnation, and economic stagnation itself is costly. It means the economy is not adding jobs, and some people are losing jobs.
MA: Japanese companies didn’t want to fire workers, so what they did was cut down on new hires. And what this did was, it affected high school and college grads who were entering the workforce at the time.
HOSHI: That was probably the biggest cost of Japanese stagnation. The young people didn’t get jobs and were not hired into good jobs.
WONG: Takeo says young people got stuck in part-time jobs, which meant they had trouble leveling up their skills and advancing their careers. They carried the scarring effects of the economic stupor for years afterward. This is something that happened with young workers during the Great Recession in the U.S., too.
MA: Japanese Central Bank, the Bank of Japan – it did try to stimulate the economy. It cut interest rates, even taking them down to zero. And it also bought government bonds – a policy that we might know as quantitative easing. And on top of all that, the Japanese government spent massively on public works projects like roads and bridges.
WONG: But demand, spending and borrowing remained stubbornly low, even with interest rates at rock bottom. That horizontal part of the L-shape just kept extending. Some economists put the blame on the central bank for not acting more decisively.
HOSHI: The Bank of Japan, many people argue, certainly should have been able to cut the interest rate more aggressively or start what is now known as quantitative easing earlier.
MA: In Takeo’s view, calling this period an L-shaped recovery actually doesn’t fully capture what happened. He says the economy would start recovering only to have that progress wiped out by some kind of big event. For instance, in the late ’90s, Japan suffered a banking crisis where several large institutions collapsed. And in response, the government stepped in to inject capital into the financial system.
HOSHI: I think that many people started to feel the stagnation of the Japanese economy during the banking crisis. People started to lose jobs, which didn’t happen very often in Japan, at least in the last 50 years.
WONG: So there was a banking crisis followed by a small recovery in the mid-2000s, and then the global financial crisis pushed Japan back into recession.
HOSHI: So it’s a short history, the lost two decades or lost three decades for Japan. It wasn’t quite L-shaped. It was continued failure of pulling the economy out of recession.
MA: Takeo says Japan’s struggles have influenced the way other countries deal with downturns. Like, here in the U.S., after the dot-com crash in 2000, the U.S. Federal Reserve acted aggressively to cut interest rates because it wanted to avoid an extended Japanese-style recession. And then several years later, during the financial crisis, the Fed and also other central banks around the world – they used quantitative easing inspired, again, by Japan. So Japan is, like, kind of the QE OG.
WONG: Today Japan is seeing elevated prices along with the rest of the world, although prices have been so low for so long that their version of higher inflation is 2%. Takeo says Japanese companies are still very reluctant to raise their prices even when their costs go up. And at the same time, workers don’t ask for pay increases – or at least they haven’t yet.
HOSHI: People in many countries, including Japan and including the U.S., too, totally forgot about inflation can be very high. So it’s – I’m sure it’s new to many people in Japan, especially young people.
MA: Yeah. I mean, a lot of folks might not have the muscle memory for high inflation. But certainly, policymakers have studied enough history to know what the outcomes are that they want to avoid. They do not want an L shape.
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MA: This episode of THE INDICATOR was produced by Corey Bridges and Jamila Huxtable with engineering by Maggie Luther. It was fact-checked by Kathryn Yang. Viet Le is our senior producer. Kate Concannon edits the show. And THE INDICATOR is a production of NPR.
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Aug 11, 2022 by The Beat Maker - 0 Comments